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THE CHRISTIAN ASPECT OE BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY
Christianity is destined to be the world's religion. But in th
realization of that destiny Christianity has met stubborn resistance
From Jesus to Bergson materialism has strongly opposed Christ-
ianity.
W
The struggle between Christianity and Materialism:
Jesus and the Sadducees.
In the discussion Jesus implied the validity of the
soul's experience.
Christianity and Epicurean philosophy.
Epicurean philosophy practically anti-theistic.
Christianity and Stoicism.
Stoicism a system that identifies God and matter.
In the Third century the tide turned toward spiritual
values.
The work of Plotinus.
Christianity adopted as the religion of the Empire.
Little materialistic thought during the Middle Ages.
Ecclesiast icisra and Scholasticism.
The revival of Materialism in the Seventeenth century.
The work of Gassendi, DrsCartes, Hobbes, and Bacon
gave impetus to this movement.
In France the movement was carried to the extreme of
atheism.
‘Resulted in lower morals.
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Influence of atheism on the Revolution.
Reaction against atheism and development of
idealism.
Renaissance if materialistic thought in the latter half
of the Nineteenth century.
Causes:
Excess of idealism.
Development of 'the physical sciences.
Detrimental to religion and morals.
Besides this theoretical materialism there is a practical
materialism.
The spirit that centers in things rather than in
spiritual truth.
The commercial spirit.
Love of display.
The pleasure spirit.
This spirit of materialism, theoretical and practical, has
hindered the progress of Christianity. Bergson meets the need.
The Philosophy of Bergson:
Here follows a brief review of Bergson’s Philosophy, touch-
ing especially on those points which seem related to
Christianity and to life. The purpose being to establish
a basis for comparison with Christianity and a means for
estimating its value.
His idea of reality.
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His theory of knowledge.
Life as Creative Evolution.
The universe as Creative Evolution.
Bergson's philosophy and Christianity.
God:
The leading philosophers' idea of God.
The Christian's idea of God.
Bergson's idea of God.
He is unceasing life, action, freedom.
He is the Creative Force, always changing,
always experimenting, constantly realising
himself more and more.
The question of the personality of Bergson's God.
The antinomy of God's absolutism and man's
freedom disappears under Bergson's view.
Intelligence and Instinct.
Evolution not in a straight line through vegetative,
animal instinct and human reason, but the creative
movement has split up and has evolved through three
distinct lines, — vegetative, instinctive, rational.
The field of intellect is matter.
Its reports are valid in its field.
The field of instinct is life.
Its reports are valid in its field.
This distinction between intelligence and instinct has
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value for religion, for religion is life, and, ac-
cording to this view the intellect cannot despise the
impulses of the soul when their validity is not
logically demonstrated.
The doctrine of God has been a stumbling-block
to intellect ualism, for it could not be logically
proved.
The intuition demands a God, and its voice is
authoritative.
The question of immortality.
Many arguments for immortality.
All such arguments fall short of proof.
The intellect ualist would therefore deny it.
But the soul demands immortality.
The doctrine has value for life.
Paul's estimate of the doctrine.
The opinions of Seeley, Renan, Romanes.
If the Doctrine has such value for life, and instinct-
ively humanity demands it, we should accept it.
Bergson's doctrine of creative freedom.
The mechanical theory of Creation.
The finalistic theory.
In neither of these is there freedom.
Bergson's doctrine is a doctrine of freedom, of op-
timism, of hope, of inspiration to Christian faith.
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THE CHRISTIAN ASPECT OF BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY.
One day while conduct ing the class in Gompararive Religions at
Boston University School of Theology Dr. W. F. Warren, who always
refers to Christianity as the world religion, was asked by a student
in what sense he regarded Christianity as the world religion.
Quickly the Doctor replied, "Both in adaptation and in destination."
And he spoke the faith that was in him, which is also the faith of
the intelligent Christian world.
But in the progressive realization of that destiny there has been
from the beginning a stubborn resistance. The struggle has been
largely between spirituality on the one hand and on the other mater-
iality manifesting itself now in one form and now in another. The
conflict began when Jesus met the Sadducees on the question of the
resurrection, and it continues today as the church, in the field
of religion, and Eucken and Bergson, in the field of philosophy,
assail .with telling effect the intrenched forces of material
philosophy. And as in the beginning Jesus silenced the Sadducee,
so these modern spiritual thinkers are having the better of the argu-
ment with the advocates of a mechanical universe. And that type
of philosophy which identifies matter and spirit, soul and body,
makes thought only a manifestation of matter, and leaves no place
for immortality in a dead and dying universe, is being shorn of its
power to depress and paralyze the spiritual aspirations of man.
And as a result, Christianity will make the more rapid progress in
accomplishing its destiny as the world religion.
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'To understand the probable influence of Bergson on Christianity
it will be helpful to review the historic struggle between Christ-
ianity and materialism.
When Jesus was laying the foundations: of the Christian religion
he laid stress upon the spiritual nature of man and God, upon God’s
providence, the resurrection, and the immortality of the soul. A
crude materialism met the advent of the new spiritual philosophy
at the threshold and challenged its authority. It was the Sadducee;,.
who said that there was no resurrection (Matt. 22:23) neither angel
nor spirit (Acts 23: 8), who denied the providence of God and the
"immortal duration of the soul" (Josephus, Wars of the Jews, Bk. II 8:
14) that thus took issue with Jesus. In reply to their arguments
Jesus excused their materialism on the grounds of ignorance of the
Scriptures and of the power of God. His answer was significant,
for it not only rendered speechless his opponents, but it implied
the possibility of getting nearer to truth and reality through the
soul's experience than through the logical understanding.
In the early centuries Christianity had to meet the material-
istic influence of the Epicurean philosophy. Lucretius, the chief
exponent of 'Epicureanism, the man who more than any one else
organized the rather loose and incoherent teachings of Epicurus
into a system, died only fifty-five years before Christ. And this
unspiritual conception of life had permeated the Greek world during
the early history of the church, t?hile Epicureanism is not wholly
anti-thestic in theory, it is thoroughly ant i-theistic on its
practical side. While there are doubtless gods, they have no inter-
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sst and no practical relationship to man. Man's soul is so related
to his body that the dissolution of the body means the dissolution
of the soul; thus the hope and fear of immortality are groundless,
and men should disabuse their minds of all thoughts of immortality,
and deliver their souls from all fear of death.
Stoicism, which existed in its Roman form during the first and
second centuries, while ethically sounder and more valuable as a
philosophy than Epicureanism, yet as a philosohpy, or at least
in its metaphysics, it had little in common with Christianity. The
Stoic philosophy was a kind of materialistic pantheism. All’ reality
is material. The soul itself is corporeal, and each individual soul
a part of the world soul, which, after a period of individuality
is reabsorbed into the world-soul; the whole system passing through
infinite cycles of differentiation and absorption. A system which
thus identifies God and Matter and has no place for individual
immortality furnished a poor field for Christian progress.
During the first two centuries of the Christian era the relig-
ious spirit suffered violence at the hands of these worldly-wise
philosophies. The sovereignty of the intellect was recognized and
the impulses of the soul were stifled and the voices of the heart
were silenced. But such a period of spiritual depression could not
last. A reaction set in, and during the third century there was
a turning again to spiritual values, and a period of religious
speculation began. Under Plotinus this new interest in religion and
the spiritual conception of life was given impetus. The value of
the inner life, the validity of the emotional, was recognized. This
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period emphasized the importance of the individual, and recognized
the essential nature of morals and religion. In these particulars
it prepared the way for the reception of Christianity into higher
circles and made possible its adoption as the religion of the
Empire soon after.
It was easier for Christianity to extend itself in the middle
ages because there was little if any materialistic speculation.
Christianity was accepted by the thinkers of that age, and the
doctrines of that faith occupied the minds of scholars. The clash
of intellects was not on the question of a material or a spiritual
universe but on the nature and the purpose of the spiritual creator
of the universe and his present relationship to the world. Theistic
thought dominated the whole of the mediaeval period. Between
ecclesiast icism and scholasticism materialism was silenced. But
with the breaking up of scholasticism and the overthrow of ecclesias-
ticism there was a renaissance of material philosophy. The revival
of materialism began in the seventeenth century. Gassendi and
DesGartes, in France, and Hobbes and Bacon, in England, gave
impetus to the movement. Neither of these men was a thoroughgoing
materialist, as each believed in a creative agent, and most of
them held to their Christian faith; but something of the influence
of even such semi-materialism as these men pr cclaimed is snen in
the low moral life in that period of French and English history.
It is impossible to undermine the positive spiritual faith of the
people, or to cast any shadow of doubt upon the spiritual values
of life or the immortality of the soul, without pushing the moral
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life of the people to a lower level. It remained for France to carry
materialism to the extreme of atheism; and even there it was an
evolution. Voltaire, while opposing Christianity, disclaimed atheisan.
Rousseau would have nothing to do with atheism, but from Rousseau,
Voltaire and Condillac it was but a step to atheism; and this step
was taken by Le Mettrie, Diderot, Von Holbach, Lalande and others.
These men reached the extreme and untenable conception of an absol-
utely material universe. nThere is no God, there is no soul, there
is nothing in the universe which may not be resolved into matter or
motion." Such atheism had an immediate effect upon the morals of
its advocates. Sensuous pleasure was the chief good of life, self-
love about the only motive. If men are only as the beasts they will
live about as the beasts live, and the principle of beastial life
is selfishness. We would therefore look for an indifferent type of
morals in the lives of these atheistic materialists, and we are not
disappointed? for, impurity, licentiousness, and untruthfulness
characterize many of these earlier advocates of a soulless universe.
This immoral and irreligious infection spread to the masses, ana
there was a rapid decline in morals and moral responsibility. The
outcome were the excesses, atrocities and abandon of the Revolu-
tion. It would be unfair, probably, tc attribute the Revolution
dieectly and entirely to the teaching of these atheists, but it
would be unhistorical to release this school of philosophers from
responsibility in large measure for the selfishness and inhuman-
ity of the Revolution. For nearly two centuries the morals and
rsligi- 011 of France have suffered a
’
t the hands cf material philosophy.
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and the deplorable immoral and unchristian character of Prance today
is due largely to the atheistic character of her earlier philosophers.
The extreme type of materialism which prevailed during the
Revolution period did not continue long. A reaction set in, and under
the leadership of such idealists as Goethe, Schelling, Fichte and
Hegel the ungodly and unchristian philosophy of Le Met trie and Von
Holbach rapidly loosened its hold on the lives of the people. But
the respite was of short duration, for before the middle of the nine-
teenth century the revival of materialism was fully under way. Two
general reasons might be given tor this revival: The first was the
excesses of idealism. Under Hegel idealism was pushed to such
extremes as to bring it into disrepute. In trying to make practical
his ideas the people were disappointed, and their dissatisfaction
turned them back to a more realistic view of life and things. Our
experience, after all, is rather closely related to things of the
senses., and, as Dr. Bowne says, our experience is real to us, and
it will not do to push our idealism so far as to discredit our real
experience, for experience will assert itself even at the expense
of philosophy and religion. The other reason for the return to
materialism was the rapid development of the physical sciences
.
The nineteenth century has been supremely the century of science.
Natural law is traced through all things, and all material
phenomena in earth and sky are determined by law, and every fact
of nature may be regarded as either cause of effect. The work-
ing hypothesis of these materialistic scientists is that a fact
shown to be the result of law is thereby fully explained, and
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that the law itself needs no explanation. The more generally the
facts of nature are seen to be controlled by law the less the need
of any external influence to explain these facts; the more law the
less God; and according to Comte we shall sooner or later be able to
take God to the frontier -and bow him out with thanks. COmte, Mill,
Darwin, Spencer, Haeckel, have been among the modern leaders of
material thought; while positivism, mechanical evolutionism and
pantheism have been the leading systems of modern material philosophy
As these anti-spiritual theories of the world and life have filtered
down through society, even down to the uneducated masses, they have
tended to stifle religious impulse and destroy the influence of the
supernatural. When belief in the supernatural and the spiritual is
weakened, then morals decay and religion fails to impress. Belief
in God and in the spiritual nature of man and in the immortality
of the soul acts as a strong safe-guard to the common good. It
creates a fear that restrains or a faith that aspires, and in
either case braces the moral tone of life and holds it to a higher
level. And when that support is removed, as it is removed by the
ascendency of materialism, the tendency of life is inevitably down-r
wards, and humanity approximates the animal world.
Practical materialism: There is, besides this materialism of
the schools, a practical materialism that opposes Christianity at
every point. It affects not only theoretical materialists but
also theoretical theists. It is life rather than theory, and is
manifest in every age. It is the spirit that centers interst in
things rather than in spiritual truth. It is the commercial
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spirit that puts gain above honesty, and success above duty, whose em-
blem is the dollar sign and whose goal is wealth. It is the pleasure-
loving spirit that will be satisfied even at the cost of higher
virtues; the yielding to the dominion of the sensual rather than
to the spiritual. It is the love of display that manifests itself
in barbarous and inexcusable extravagance. In bondage to the world,
ruled by the flesh, on good terms with the devil, the people lose
sight of spiritual values. To a people obsessed with the spirit of
practical materialism Christianity with its high spirituality
makes little appeal.
Materialism, theoretical and practical, has beset the pathway
of Christianity with many a difficulty and hindered its progress.
Against such unspiritual philosophies and practices men like Bowne,
Eucken and Bergson have set in motion a strong spiritual current
which bids fair to turn back the tide of materialism and bring about
a condition more favorable to the extension of the Christian religion.
Our study of Bergson from the Christian viewpoint is doubtless
a little premature, for he has not spoken specifically on religion
as yet, but has in course of preparation a book which will give his
conception of God and religion. So, in working out the present
paper we are limited to a study of his published works, which are
exclusively philosophical. The list includes (translations) "Time
and Free Will" , "Matter and Memory", "Creative Evolution" , and one
or two other books of minor importance. Creative Evolution is his
most important published work:, and contains largely his. system.
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9It is usual when beginning the study of a philosopher to class-
ify him: is he realist or idealist? When thinking of his opposition
to the materialist by giving to the world a spiritual nature and
interpreting the universe in spiritual terms we think of Bergson as
an idealist. But when we remember that he holds to the possibility
and the fact of the immediacy of knowledge of things by direct
vision or intuition of reality instead of through a medium of
appearances we are inclined to think of him as a realist. But
when we get to the center of his philosophy we find that the terms
ideal and real lose their significance, or at least become but
partial aspects of a greater truth. From the early mediaeval
period until recent times philosophy has been of the scholastic or
intellect ualistic type; every theory, idea and aspiration was test-
ed in the crucible of logic. Because life, spirit, reality could
not be enclosed in a syllogism the philosopher was driven to
skepticism. Then came the pragmatist with his "workable 17 theories
of truth and sought to depose the logical and set up the practical
as the sovereign way to truth and reality. But while the intel-
loctualist failed to satisfy life, the pragmatist failed to satisfy
the intellect. The difference between these two schools, of course,
lies in the difference in their conceptions of the absolute— the
intellect ualist holding that intellect is absolute and the pragma-
tist that life is absolute. The real difficulty will be seen to
lie in the problem of knowledge, or the relation of mind to matter.
There are three historical theories as to the relation between
the mind which knows and the things it knows: (l) That the mind
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is affected by things, or the tabula rasa theory of the sensational-
ist; (2.) That the mind constitutes its own knowledge, or gives its
constitution to things, as per Kant; (3) That there is a pre-estab-
lished harmony between mind and things, as per Leibnitz. But Berg-
son comes out with a new theory, which is, that there is a creative
movement, the evolution of life, producing the intellect which gives
its form to knowledge, and that the very same movement has produced
the materiality which gives to things their power of being known.
The correspondence between mind and things is thus seen to be a
natural one, for it is one and the same movement which has given
rise toe the intellect which knows and to the things which are known.
In Bergson’s universe, then, we have not only mind and matter, but
that which is back of both and overflows and explains both—reality
itself. This reality is the "elan vital 1,’ the life urge or' impetus.
This elan vital is the force or principle of his”0reative Evolu-
tion’.’ Bergson breaks with the materialist or the physicist not
in the legitimate field of physios, but when the physicist steps
out of the bounds of the physical and endeavors, to interpret the
whole of reality in physical terms. And his reason is that the real-
ity which we know best and with which we are most intimately
related is a reality which physical science can neither explain
nor comprehend. That reality is life. Fh.ysical science has to do
with material things of the senses, the world which we know, or
which lies within the possibility of our knowledge. In this field
of things science is at home, and its rights and findings must be
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respected. But the scientist seems prone to enter the field of aeta
physics, or at least, if he denies metaphysics, to comprehend all
reality. His objective is to demonstrate the universe as a complete
and perfect mechanism, each state of which explains every other stat
He conceives a world in which action and re-action are completely
balanced, in which no new fact, no real creation, no actual freedom
is possible. To physical science movement, change, becoming, are
apparent, not real. Movement is only alteration in a space that is
motionless; change is but a rearrangement of parts that are them-
selves unchangeable; becoming is a fixed relation between an effect
and its antecedent condition. A material thing, then, when known
in all its relations is completely comprehended for all time.
Now life, says Bergson, is very different from all this. A
living thing changes constantly, not only apparently, but in reality
Time is of its very essence. Life is an activity, but it is not
like the activities with which physical science deals. There is no
standard by which it can be measured: it obeys no law of conserva-
tion or of dissipation of energy. It Is continual creation, con-
tinual becoming. We can work this out in our own experience: We
are warm or we are cold, we are active or at rest, we are in good
health ( we suffer with disease; now ordinarily we regard the
change as taking place in the passage from one state to another,
but that the states persist until another change shall usher in an-
other state. But the truth of the matter is that change is constant
Let us use Bergson's own illustration of this statement:” Let us
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take the most stable of external states, the visual perception of a
motionless external object. The object may remain the same, I may
look at it from the same side, at the same angle, in the same light,
nevertheless the vision I now have of it differs from that I have
just had, even if only it is an instant older than the other. My
memory is there, which conveys something of the past into the
present. My mental state as it advances on the road of time is
continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates: It
goes on increasing—rolling upon itself as a snow-ball on the snow.
Still more is this the case with states more deeply internal, such
as sensations, feelings, desires etc., which do not correspond, like
a simple visual perception, to an unvarying external object. But it
is expedient to disregard this uninterrupted change, and to notice
it only when it becomes sufficient to impress a new attitude on the
body, a new direction on the attention. Then, and then only, we
find our state has changed. The truth is that we change without
ceasing, and that the state itself is nothing but change." This
constant change is life, duration, reality. Now because life is
change, and at each moment is something different than it can
possibly be at any other moment, past or future, every moment
of life is a new creation. Life, then, is creative evolution.
Bergson applies this same line of argument to the universe
as a whole. In dealing with matter we isolate objec+s or systems
from the general whole for convenience. Physical soienoe, even,
does not go to the end and isolate completely, but only for the
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convenience of study. In themselves these objects or systems may be
discontinuous and changeless; that is, changeless except as to dis-
placement of parts; and as these parts may be reassembled in the
same state as often as they see fit, the group does not grow old,
it has no history, it does not change. But if we carry these iso-
lated parts through their various relationships—the world, the
solar system, the universe—we must come to that which endures
—
the whole, carrying all of its past into the present, pressing into
the future, moving, changing, creating, maturing. Thus even as a
living thing the universe is in constant flux and its movement is
a creative evolution.
Reasoning along this line Bergson works out his philosophy.
The principle or force that works at the center he calls the ”elan
vital” or the life impetus. This elan vital has been from the begin-
ning seeking to realize itself more and more fully, just as through
life man seeks to realize himself more fully. This evolutuon, or
creative ‘movement, has taken place not in a straight line, but in
the form of a sheaf, taking divergent directions, among which its
impetus is divided. We may get a notion of his meaning here, he
says, by studying the development of out own characters. aEach
of us glancing backwards over Pur history will find that our child
personality, though indivisible, united in itself divers persons,
which could remain blended just because they were in their nascent
state. This indecision, so charged with promise, is one of the
greatest charms of childhood; but these interwoven personalities
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become incompatible in course of growth, and, as each of us can live
but one life, a choice must per force be made. We choose, in reali-
ty, without ceasing; also we abandon many things. The route we pur-
sue in time is strewn with the remains of all that we began to be,
of all that we might have become.” The individual, because of his
limitation, must choose and must abandon; but nature has no such
limitation, but has an incalculable number of lives at her disposal
and is not under the necessity of making any such sacrifices, but
continues the diverse lines or off-shoots of the creative movement
and permits them to evolve separately, and we have a world of
varied life and organism. This creative movement is upward, but in
its upward movement it meets matter in a descending scale, and the
conflict of the ages is on. The life force is the vital impetus
persisting, pushing itself upward, taking hold of matter, molding
it, subjecting it to its needs; but now and then, finding no pass
through the impregnable wall, is turned back upon itself, eddying
permanently in' vegetism. At another place it pushes further up
through the descending mass, but is again stopped and turned in upon
itself, eddying permanently in animal life with movement and instinct
but at one point this living force has been able to overcome all
resistance and project itself through matter into a state of con-
sciousness, and humanity emerges, the highest and perhaps the final
realization of the life force, with potentialities that will doubt-
less triumph over all resistance and obtain absolute freedom.
GOD : To Plato God was the Father and the Greater of the uni-
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.
verse, the absolutely immutable and simple Being, from whom all un-
changeableness and simplicity and all truth are derived. But a
being apart from man and difficult to find. To Aristotle God is
pure form, pure Idea, pure Intelligence, himself ummoved, but the
source of all motion and the origin of all reason, but who has no
further relationship to the world. To Spinoza God is the ground of
Reality, the one original substance manifesting itself in Thought
and Extension. He is the immanent cause of all things. Mot provi-
dential nor concerned with man. The Christian God is the Creator of
all things, the source of all life, and the ruler of the universe.
He is immanent in all things, yet transcendent over all. He is
Spirit and Life. He is from everlasting to everlasting, complete,
eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, ever working to
accomplish his eternal purposes.
The God of Bergson differs from all this. God is the Elan Vital,
the Vital Impulse, or Impetus, the creative force always moving,
always changing, always experimenting, constantly realizing him-
self more and more. In the words of a reviewer: "We are asked to
regard God as a vast experimenter working in the cosmic laboratory
as a creative force, struggling against the intractability of inert
matter, and triumphing by subtlety and persislence. " Quoting Berg-
son himself: "Gcd thus defined has nothing of the already-made. He
is unceasing life, action, freedom." He is a developing God, grow-
ing and realising himself by his experience, even as a man grows and
realizes himself more and more by his experience. He has no plan
conceived from eternity which he is working out. There is no final-
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ism in the universe; but working and experimenting, succeeding and
failing, growing, progressing, expanding, Qod advances, more and more
realising himself.
The question is raised as to the personality of Bergson’s God.
Is it not mere blind force, unconsciously at work, carrying all
things in its onward sweep? The questioner may be excused for his
misgivings on this point; for there is a vagueness in his presenta-
tion of God which makes it difficult for the reader to arrive at any
clear conception of his meaning. This fault will in all probability
be remedied when he publishes his book on religion. But there is no
real reason yet for denying personality to the elan vital, the force
at work in Great ive Evolution. ‘The denial of finality to this
force is not equivalent to denying its personality. Personality
implies purpose, but purpose is net identical with clearly defined
ends. A man may be possessed of a great purpose without having his
plans clearly laid for its accomplishment; and even the plans he
may have laid must needs be changed because of unforeseen diffi-
culties, or because by experience he has learned a better way. One
may have in mind the writing of a book, and ha has a conception of
what he wants to put in the book, but as he proceeds new thoughts
develop and new plans present themselves and new difficulties
arise, and when finally his work is completed he has accomplished
his purpose and the product is greater than the conception, for
it contains the original comception with all the experience
involved in the process of its realization added. An artist may
purpose to paint a picture, and he has a more or less clearly de-
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fined mental picture which he desires to transfer to the canvas, but
as he proceeds with his work the image changes, features are elimina
ted and others are added, colors moderate, shadows deepen, every
moment of his experience making its impress upon the work of his
hands, until when the picture is finished it is all that he was
when he began plus what he became while he wrought upon it. But we
will not deny purpose in his art. In this restricted sense Bergson’
God may be purposive, and therefore personal. While such a view of
God is considerably below the Christian view in splendor, power and
wisdom, yet possibly it puts God a little more in touch with human-
ity. It is a little difficult to relate ourselves to an absolute
God. We feel more at home with one who has been "tempted in all
points like as we are; "who has tried and failed, who has suffered
disappointment, who has been compelled to tack and try another
course. When we read "It repented him” we feel a little more close-
ly related to God. If the world, as it is today, is the result of
the toil and persistence, the patience and hope of the great Exper-
imenter, rather than the doubtful product of an Omnipotent Hand, a
little light would be let in on the mystery. The Evil of the
world snapping its fingers in the face of its Omnipotent Creator
is a hard test for the reasoning power of the average mind.
Another age-long antinomy that would practically disappear
under such a doctrine of God is that of God’s absolutism and man's
freedom. With an absolute God Calvinism is the only logical
doctrine of salvation. But because predest.ination and a limited
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atonement is abhorrent to the reason, we have tried to gloss ever the
harshness of the Galvinistic creed, but with little logical success.
As long as we hold to an absolute God with a definite purpose, we
will have difficulty with the question of man's freedom. As long as
man questions his freedom in the least degree there will be a shad-
ow on his life, and a limit to the optimism so necessary to life’s
fulness and power. Man could not have attained his present moral
and spiritual status had not his life been greater than his theory.
But it were better that his logical theory, instead of impeding his
soul, become its inspiration, its hope, its ideal. The Christian
world is not ready to incorporate into its theology the doctrine
of a developing, experimenting God. It will be slow to revolution-
ize its theology at any point, for theology, when once crystalized
in human thought, becomes almost impregnable to change. But if
Bergson in his philosophy has constituted a God who is a little
more comprehensible to the human intellect, and whose experiences
are a little more closely related to the experiences of humanity,
that philosophy is not wholly unrelated to Christian thought and
life. For the author of such a doctrine grappling with the real
problems of the universe will have "let in a ray of light, in the
beneficent beams of which many things are sure to grow and fructify."
Bergson’s discussion of Intelligence and Instinct has a bear-
ing on the problems of Christianity. Intellectualism has cast manv
obstacles in the path of Christianity, and has impeded the progress
of spiritual life. Bergson refuses to permit the intellect to lord
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it over the soul, but gives to instinct a position of authority in
the realm of reality. Intellect ualism has been a prolific scuree
of confusion to earnest souls. Ever since Zeno put forth his logic -
story of Achilles and the tortoise logic has reflected the facts
of experience. If experience does not co-incide with logic, then
experience is wrong and but a delusion, for logic, of course, is
supreme. Even if Achilles did appear to overtake the tortoise he
did not do so in fact, for it was a logical impossibility for him
to do so. If impulse, motive, desire, spiritual consciousness were
without logical foundation or support, then they were without value
f'or life. Such intellectual domination has not been good for the
soul, it has hampered man's highest aspirations, it has chilled his
spiritual fervor and broken down the supports: of his faith. Berg-
son would condition this absolutism of the intellect by limiting
the field of its operations, and at the same time would give validi-
ty to the decrees, or the dictates, of instinct. He begins his
attack on intellectualism by criticising it fundamentally. He says
that "the cardinal error which, from Aristotle onwards, has vitiated
most of the philosophies of nature, is to see in vegetative, instinc-
tive and rational life, three successive degrees of the development
of one and the same tendency, whereas, they are three divergent
directions of an activity that has split up as it grew. The differ-
ence between them is not a difference of intensity, nor, more gener-
ally, of degree, but of kind." The original distinction between man
and the lower animals was the making and use of tools. We push
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back the beginnings of the life of man to the earliest age in which
implements or manufactured tools are found. “Intelligence” says
Bergson, “considered in what seems to be its original features, is
the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, especially tools
to make tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture.” The
use of instruments is not altogether unknown among lower animals,
but such instruments are organized, natural, and not manufactured,
while man manufactures his instruments. The perfected instinct
is the faculty of using organized instruments, intelligence perfect-
ed is the faculty of making and using unorganized instruments. His
inference is that "Instinct and intelligence represent two diver-
gent solutions of one and the same problem." Continuing the argu-
ment he finds that intelligence in its beginning had for its chief
object the unorganized solid, and that of the discontinuous only
does it form a clear idea; unable to grasp change, becoming,
infinite divisibility, it simply blocks out of space the matter which
it can use. Its field is matter, it is at home with solids, its
method is geometrical. But when applied to movement in space and in
time, to becoming, to change, to spirit, intellect becomes confused
and loses its way. "The intellect is characterized by a natural
inability to comprehend life."
The instinct, on the contrary, is directly in touch with life;
In fact, so closely is instinct related to life that it is scarcely
I
possible to distinguish where life's organic processes cease and
instinct begins. The little chick which breaks its shell with a
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peck of its beak does so by instinct, but it is merely carrying on
the movement which has borne it through embryonic life. Or, take
the cells of the living body, all working to the common end—the
body’s welfare, each separately preserving itself, defending it-
self, feeding itself, reproducing itself; acting as if possessed of
instinct, but only performing its natural function. Now compare
this to the bees within a hive, each acting for the common welfare
and unable to live apart from the others, yet each performing its
function of building, providing, defending, doing by instinct what
the cell dees organically. Here life and instinct are so closely
identified as to be indistinguishable.
By a variety of illustrations and deductions Bergson shows that
the realm of instinct is life, and that instinct has remained there,
while intelligence, formerly at one with instinct, has stepped out
of its original bounds and has become absorbed in the utilization
of inert matter. This divergent and dissimilar development has made
it impossible for intelligence to reabs erb instinct or to perform
the functions of instinct. "That which is instinctive in instinct
cannot be expressed in terms of intelligence, nor, consequently,
can it be analyzed,” for intelligence and instinct are turned in
opposite directions, the former towards inert matter, the latter
towards life. Intelligence works by conceptual logic, its method
is scientific. ”It goes all around life, taking from the outside
the greatest possible number of views of it, drawing it into it-
self instead of entering into it. But it is to the very inward-
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ness of life" that instinct leads us. In man instinct has become
something more than in the lower f crms of life. Through the push
of the intellect instinct has become "self-conscious and capable
of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely,"
and is called intuition. "Without intelligence it would have re-
mained in the form of instinct, riveted to the special object of
its practical interest, and turned outward by it into movements
of locomotion." Yet it transcends intellect, insinuating itself
into the very domain of life, which the intellect cannot do.
Briefly stated, the difference between Bergson’s evolution
and the ordinary view is that while the old view regarded evolu-
tion as in a straight line through organic matter, vegetable
matter, animal instinct and human reason, with reason at the top
and in absolute authority, the Bergson view is that the creative
force, running through matter, has split up and evolved through three
distinct lines, vegetative, instinctive and rational, and that the
instinctive has life as its domain, while the rational has matter
as its domain, and each is authoritative in its own field. Bergson’s
view gives to instinct, or intuit ion, a standing that it has never en-
joyed, and never could enjoy, under the old view, and gives valid-
ity to some important religious and Christian doctrines that lie out-
side the possibility of logical demonstration.
The Christian doctrine of God has always been a stumbling block
to the intellectualist
,
who must have everything proved by intel-
lectual processes before accepting it. This was the difficulty of
the positivist; the doctrine of the Unknown and the Unknowable grew
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out of the same view; and the atheist sooffed at the idea of a God
who had wholly escaped the senses, and had never formed the conclu-
sion of a bona fide syllogism. Of course this intellect ualistic
attitude toward God ha3 not prevented millions of human beings
from accepting the doctrine of God and enjoying the blessings of
their faith. But such faith has been held in defiance of intel-
lectualism, with its root and ground in experience rather than in
reason. Out of this situation grew the so-called conflict between
religion and science, which could never have arisen had the phil-
osophy of Bergson prevailed; for religion grows out of the emotions
and passions and needs of life, which is the domain of the intui-
tion, and not out of the intellect whose domain is science and
matter. Seligion is a feeling, an experience, a life, and not an
intellectual process. If we feel God, if we experience God, if we
live God, we have a ground for our doctrine of God that is as
authoritative, or more so, than if God were the necessary conclu-
sion of a logical process; for he is a necessity to that sympathetic
understanding which we call intuition, and which, according to Berg-
son, is authoritative in life.
Or take the question of immortality: We cannot prove that the
soul is immortal. 'There are many arguments advanced in favor of
the doctrine. There is the biological argument, the argument from
the nature of the soul, the ethical, the Biblical argument, and
many other arguments for the soul's immortality. But each and all
of them fall short of proof. And as no argument has ever been
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advanced that is equivalent to a demonstration the intellectual is
t
would say that we cannot accept the doctrine. But intuitively we
feel that we are destined to live. The idea of immortality is
practically universal to the human race. It is not always in the
same form, but it always appears in some form. Likewise the desire
for immortality is general in mankind. It is evident that both idea
and desire are germinal in the life of man. If that is true, then,
Bergson would hold that the doctrine is about as well established
as if it were logically proved to the understanding, for it is the
voice of instinct heard in the soul. The value of the doctrine of
immortality for human life is incalculable. The Christian faith
lives or dies with the belief in immortality. Says Paul of the value
of this faith: "If Christ be not risen from the dead we are of all
men most miserable." Haeckel, the materialist, dissents on this
point, and says: "The abandonment of the hope of a future would
involve no painful loss, but would be an inestimable benefit for
humanity." Of the men who have gained any standing in the world
of thought Haeckel stands quite alone on this point. The great
materialists as a rule have recognized the value of the doctrine
of immortality for the life of the present. Seeley, author of
"Ecce Homo" and "Natural Religion", the latter work written to
disprove the resurrection of Christ, says, "We may well doubt
whether the natural, the material, can suffice for human life. No
sooner do we try to think so—no sooner do we try to get rid of the
idea of immortality—than Pessimism raises its head. ***** ** The
whole moral world is reduced to a point, good and evil, right and
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.
wrong, become infinitesimal, ephemeral matters. The affections die
away—die of their own conscious feebleness and uselessness. A
moral paralysis creeps over us." Renan, who doubted immortality,
says concerning its value for life, "The day in which the belief in
an after life shall vanish from the earth will witness a terrific
moral and spiritual decadence. Some of us might perhaps do without
it, provided only that others held it fast. But there is no lever
capable of raising an entire people, if they once have lost their
faith in the immortality of the soul." Romanes, in the interval
between losing and regaining his faith, wrote these pathetic words?
"It is with the utmost sorrow that I find myself obliged to accept
the conclusions here worked out. I am not ashamed to confess that
the universe has' lost for me its soul of loveliness; and when at
times I think, as think I must, of the appalling contrast between
the hallowed creed that onoe was mine and the lonely negation of
existence as I now find it, it will never be possible for me to
avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is susceptible."
If this is what a lost faith in a future life means to such
men as these, what would it mean to the multitudes who live on a
lower moral and intellectual level than these? Could it mean less
than the loss of all moral incentive, of all rational grounds of
self-sacrifice, and consequently a tremendous depreciation of
life's values? Could it mean less than the inevitable decline of
civilization and the relapse into barbarism? Any philosophy, any
system of thought, that strengthens the faith of humanity in the
doctrine of immortality, renders to humanity an inestimable service
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and allies itself with the forces of Christianity. In giving valid-
ity to the impressions of the intuition Bergson has rendered such
a service. Listening to the voice of intuition as it speaks forth
the needs of the soul, and as it directs our vision to unexplored
realms of possibility, life becomes much more hopeful and optimis-
tic, and life’s achievements far greater than could be possible
under the regime of a hard and fast intellect ualism.
There is another doctrine of Bergson’s that will give impetus
to Christian ideals: It is his doctrine of creative freedom. There
are two leading theories of creation—the mechanical and the final-
ist ic. The mechanical theory, of course, admits of no freedom what-
ever. It is a fixed and rigid system. Things, events, experiences
are ground out of necessity, and there is no place for choice in
the universe. Final ism, or the teleological theory, according to
which things and beings merely realize a purpose or a plan previous-
ly conceived, is, on its practical side, little better than the
mechanical theory, the difference being that in the former we are
pushed and in the latter we are led. In neither case is there any
real freedom, and therefore no real creation. Bergson opposes both
mechanism and finalism, and affirms the absolute freedom of creative
effort. He opposes that view, whether mechanical or teleological,
which regards the world as a closed system. He challenges the
statement of Ecclesiast icus that there is nothing new under the sun,
and takes his stand with Paul, who says, "old things have passed
away; behold, they are become new," and with Christ, who says, "Be-
hold, I make all things new." God is unceasing life, action, free-
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dom, radiating his creative power until it permeates and vitalizes
and refreshes all things. This creative power
,
carrying with it
all its past experience, crowding into the future that is open and
free, creates new life, new hopes, new worlds, destined to triumph
ultimately over all evil and all opposition, and to attain unto
perfect self-realization.
This is a philosophy of joyous optimism, for it sets at liberty
a creative movement that presses forward with irresistable power;
and all imperfection, even that which seems rooted in the very nature
of things, must sometime yield place to the advancing tide. of crea-
tive evolution. There is a philosophy that is less hopeful and more
fatalistic, a philosophy that sees necessity in things as they are:
Red-handed war, the evil that has deluged the world in blood, and
sacrificed the flower of humanity to the savage gods of greed and
power, has always existed and of course it is folly to talk of
courts of arbitration or of universal peace; pauperism, the scourge
of human life, lays its withering hand upon multitudes of hapless
human beings, creating the slum, crushing hope, denying opportun-
ity, shackling genius, and because it has ever existed it will
always exist; sin, even in its baser forms, can never be eradicat-
ed from life, because it has too firm a grip upon the human heart,
and will inevitably continue to corrupt and blight and defile the
soul, and impede the progress of social virtue.
Such fatalism, such resignation stifles human aspiration,
paralyses human effort, and issues in stoicism or despair. Against
all this the philosophy of Bergson is a strong defense, for it is
—\)
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7a philosophy of freedom, it is a philosophy of spirituality, and con-
ceives the soul of the universe as a mighty current of free spirit-
ual power, rushing through all things, freely creating all things
new. And according to the mighty working of this power, war must
cease, pauperism and poverty must disappear, sin must loosen its
grip, and the soul, shaking itself free of all impediment, shall
realize the meaning of the promises: "He shall guide you into all
truth", "and the truth shall make you free."
I(
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